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Palestine: a theoretical model of an Investment-Constrained Economy 
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The sixty-year-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict has deeply influenced the evolution of the Palestinian economy. In the 
last two decades persisting political instability and the Israeli closure policy have been sources of protracted economic 
stagnation and poor capital formation. The paper describes the consequences on the Palestinian economy of two particular 
conditions: high transaction costs and market fragmentation. We use a simple one-sector model which describes Palestine as 
a demand-driven economy and Palestinian capital accumulation as linked to desired investments by Palestinian firms. Into 
this framework, we show that high transaction costs discourage capital formation by curtailing expected profitability. Market 
fragmentation further reduces domestic investments  by reducing the  size  of the market and depressing entrepreneurs’ 
animal spirits. We show that in the short-run, where expectations are given, the two above facts induce low levels of 
capacity utilization and of capital accumulation. The situation is even more worrying in the long-run when entrepreneurs can 
adapt their expectations. Depressed  animal spirits and low levels of capacity use feed back into each other and give rise to a 
low-growth trap from which Palestine can hardly escape. We also highlight the possible positive impact of the removal of 
high transaction cost and of market fragmentation and the ensuing benefits on the long run equilibrium values of both 
capital accumulation and capacity utilization. The conclusions try to set this analytical results into the historical situation of 
the Palestinian economy and to envisage the roles of economics and politics in order to establish a sustained process of 
development. 
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That the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, 
(Adam Smith , Wealth of Nations, Book I, chapter III) 
1.  Introduction 
From the Six-Day War until the beginning of the nineties, Palestine has been exposed to the direct 
Israeli military, economic and administrative control. Since 2000 movement restrictions have continued 
to  affect  Palestinian  economic  activities.  Needless  to  say,  such  a  peculiar  environment  has  deeply 
influenced the Palestinian economy.  
If we look at trade issues Palestine appears as a province of Israel, however goods’ movements are 
not free and markets are not perfectly integrated due to Israeli restrictions. Palestine does not have a 
complete economic sovereignty. Since the Paris Protocol of 1994 there is a spurious custom union. 
Foreign trade policy is out of control of the Palestinian government and is unilaterally determined by 
Israel.  The  Palestinian  Monetary  Authority,  although  in  charge  of  regulating  domestic  financial 
institutions, cannot run an independent monetary policy due to the lack of a Palestinian currency, thus 
there is also a de facto monetary union. The tax system is largely absent; most indirect tax revenues are 
collected by Israel and subsequently transferred to the Palestinian National Authority.  
From the Oslo Treaty on, Palestine has recorded disappointing economic results (Fischer et al., 
2001; UNCTAD, 2009) and in the last decade Palestinian income per-capita has decreased (World 
Bank, 2006a; UNCTAD, 2008). Potential output has been persistently higher than effective output and 
lack  of  effective  demand  for  Palestinian  goods  has  induced  mass  unemployment  and  protracted 
economic  stagnation  (World  Bank,  2004).  When  the  attention  shifts  to  the  long  run  and  to  the 
expansion of productive capacity, poor capital formation stands out. The reason does not seem to be a 
lack  of  savings,  productive  investments  are  low  because  of  the  absence  of  profitable  investments 
opportunities and entrepreneurs’ reluctance to invest in the Palestinian economy (World Bank, 2007a). 
The depressed domestic investment climate is by far the most relevant problem Palestine has to tackle  
in order to unleash its growth potential. 
There is general agreement among economists that most of these problems depend on tight direct 
and indirect impediments to Palestinian business activities (Naqib, 2002; Akkay et al., 2008; UNCTAD, 
2008). Israeli security controls and check-point procedures have hugely increased transaction costs. 
Moreover, closures and movement restrictions have fragmented the domestic Palestinian economy and 
forced Palestinian firms into small local enclaves. Both facts have wide economic repercussions. First, 
high transaction costs reduce the competitiveness of existing activities. Second, the impossibility to 
access  large  markets  depresses  entrepreneurs’  animal  spirits,  further  curbs  investments  and  causes 
economic stagnation by constraining effective demand for Palestinian goods.   3
Several  authors  have  described  the  effects  of  such  an  economic  environment  on  Palestinian 
development. In 2001, Astrup and Dessus (2001) have implemented a neoclassical CGE model on 
Palestine. UNCTAD (2009) has developed a complex macro framework to simulate the effects of a 
wide range of institutional and political changes. However, these models fail to give due relevance to 
the demand side of the problem and to the role of investments. 
In the present work, we try to fill this gap; in particular we build a simple model which allows a 
theoretical analysis of the core issue in the Palestinian economy, i.e. the consequences on investments 
of cumbersome transaction costs and of market fragmentation. We do this through a simple one-sector 
macro model which describes a demand-driven Palestinian economy; given fixed or sticky prices, the 
level of economic activity emerges from effective demand. Moreover, we model the lack of profitable 
investment opportunities by considering an ad-hoc investment demand function for the Palestinian 
economy. Whilst this modelling strategy is grounded on well-established features of most Keynesian 
models, it allows us to get the effects that high transaction costs and small and fragmented markets 
induce on Palestinian capital accumulation by affecting expected profitability and entrepreneurs’ animal 
spirits. 
As to the long run, we show that improving or worsening economic conditions may alter the 
dynamics  of  economic  expectations,  this  way  generating  diverging  growth  paths.  Depressed 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits and low levels of capacity use can give rise to a low-growth trap from 
which Palestine can hardly escape should existing adverse economic conditions persist. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two enlightens some stylized facts about Palestine. 
Section three introduces the theoretical model. Section four presents some comparative static exercises 
through which we assess the short-run effects of high transaction costs and market fragmentation on 
Palestinian economic activity and capacity utilization. Section five discusses the long-run issues, capital 
accumulation in particular, and examines the adaptations in entrepreneur’s expectations; it also shows 
that there could be different long-run equilibria. Because of the existing economic restrictions Palestine 
is likely to be stuck in a low growth trap. Section six highlights how the removal of high transaction 
costs and of market fragmentation could unleash the growth potential of the Palestinian economy. 
Section seven concludes by drawing some political implications.      
 
2.  Some stylized facts on Palestine and the role of demand 
2.1. Some facts 
Palestine is a middle income economy whose functioning has been distorted by the extraordinary 
conditions set by the sixty-year old Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Below is a short list of the main features 
of the Palestinian economy.    4
1) Palestine is a small open economy, whose import flows amount to more than 70 percent of its 
GDP whilst exports account to a mere 14 percent. Palestine directs to Israel almost all exported goods 
and receives from it more than 70 percent of all imports. This “geographical” bias of Palestinian trade 
flows is partly explained by the de-facto custom union with Israel.  
2) From 1996 to 2007 the Palestinian trade deficit has averaged 50 percent of GDP. Such an 
extraordinary  trade  deficit  has  been  financed  in  two  ways.  First,  a  relevant  amount  of  foreign 
remittances yearly flows into Palestine
1. This reflects the considerable gap between Palestinian Gross 
Domestic Product and Gross National Product, the latter amounting to 112 percent of the former in 
2007 (PCBS, 2009a). Second, international organizations and foreign governments have so far provided 
the  bulk  of  international  aid  to  Palestine.  According  to  Valensisi  and  Missaglia  (2009),  total 
international aid to Palestine covered more than 70 percent of its trade deficit in 2007. 
3)  The  Palestinian  economy  is  chronically  stuck  in  a  less-than-full-employment  equilibrium. 
According to the World Bank (2007a), industrial capacity utilization is generally around 50 percent in 
almost all productive sectors, being equal (on average) to 57 percent in West Bank and 47 percent in 
Gaza. Moreover, from 1996 to 2007, the unemployment rate has averaged to 20 percent of total labour 
force (PCBS, 2009b). Massive open unemployment goes hand-in-hand with the contraction of the 
employment share of the industrial sector and with the expansion of a large informal sector. Due to the 
lack of formal employment opportunities, an increasing proportions of Palestinian people is involved in 
low-productive agricultural and service activities, petty trade in particular. 
4) According to the World Bank (2007a), “the size of the average industrial [Palestinian] enterprise 
is about four workers, no larger than it was in 1927”(World Bank, 2007a, p.1). Domestic firms terribly 
need physical investments to improve their competitiveness. However, despite great expectations in the 
aftermath of the Oslo agreement, capital formation has been extremely weak. From 1994 to 2007, 
investments in the non-building sector have been around a mere 15 percent of domestic GDP (PCBS, 
2003, 2008, 2009a). This share falls far below the 23 percent recorded by UNCTAD for the Least 
Developed Countries in the period 1990-2003. Moreover, it is 20 percentage points lower than the 
threshold level considered necessary to feed fast economic growth and catching-up with developed 
countries (see UNCTAD, 2006, p.91). 
 
2.2. Prices and wages 
These stylized facts need a theoretical scheme to interpret them. Actually, most of the economic 
pathologies affecting Palestine seem to have a Keynesian nature. As far as Palestinian unemployment is 
                                                 
1 For instance, remittances in 1998 to Palestinian households amounts to the 16.4 per cent of GNI (Dessus, 2004, p. 458, 
note 22).   5
concerned, the World Bank (2004) states that it “reflects the fact that demand for Palestinian goods is 
insufficient for the economy to function at full-employment”(World Bank, 2004, p.10). Other way 
around, a problem of effective demand may be at the base of chronic Palestinian mass unemployment. In 
such a context the neoclassical-type (relative) price adjustment does not seem to be useful to restore full 
employment. According to some analyses, “the Palestinian dependence on Israel pervades almost every 
aspect of economic life, including prices and other major monetary variables”(Peres Centre for Peace 
and  Paltrade,  2006,  p.12).  “Prices  in  Palestine  follow  closely  those  prevailing  in  Israel”(Femise 
Network, 2006, p.77). While this picture does not apply to all prices, in particular to those of home-
produced services and non-tradable goods, yet it is relevant in case of tradable goods. According to the 
stylized fact 1 and to the “small-country assumption”, the prices of tradable goods can be assumed as 
exogenous. More in general several prices in Palestine are fixed or at least sticky and the Palestinian 
price system only partially responds to macroeconomic imbalances. As a consequence, quantity-driven 
adjustments instead of price-driven adjustments may take place inside the economy
2. 
According to Dessus and Ruppert Bulmer (2004, p.19) the low competitiveness of Palestinian 
firms and the low investment rates depend on the relatively high cost of Palestinian labour, due to very 
high reservation wages of employment opportunities in Israel. Such a situation however has changed 
abruptly after 2000, Palestinian wages increasingly departing from those prevailing in Israel, so that any 
type of cost approach can only partly explain the low level of investments in tradable goods and in 
manufacturing in particular. 
 
2.3. Investments and savings 
The “two gaps” approach highlights the main macroeconomic features limiting growth potential in 
open  developing  economies.  Scholars  have  concentrated  mainly  on  the  saving  constraint  and  the 
foreign  exchange  constraint.  As  far  as  Palestine  is  concerned,  we  believe  that  neither  the  foreign 
exchange nor the saving constraint are binding. 
The  first  constraint  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  section,  but  it  is  worth  noting  that 
households and banks have a net asset position abroad, and there are relevant foreign exchanges flows 
arriving into the country mainly in the form of remittances and aid. 
As to the saving constraint, low levels of investments in Palestine do not seem to be the result of 
lack of savings. Actually, Palestinian banks’ deposits have constantly increased from 2003 to 2008 and 
domestic  banks  “have  been  successful  in  attracting  public  savings”(World  Bank,  2009,  p.4).  The 
domestic financial system appears highly liquid and seems to dispose of a large amount of resources to 
                                                 
2 On the adjustment mechanisms taking place inside the Palestinian economy see Arnon et al. (1997).   6
support domestic investments. However, financial institutions often prefer investing their resources 
abroad  and  to  acquire  more  secure  foreign  assets  instead  of  investing  in  the  unstable  Palestinian 
economy. 
For  sure  the  saving  ratios  have  decreased  since  2000  but  savings  are  still  relatively  high  in 
comparison to economies with similar income per capita or  in the same region, Middle East and North 
Africa. Even though Palestinian firms sometimes cite credit restriction as an obstacle to investment 
projects, credit restriction does not appear as the most relevant constraint to investments (UNCTAD, 
2004; World Bank, 2007a). Saving restrictions may rather imply lack of effective demand for credit, a well-
know problem in the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money.  
Therefore the representation of Palestinian investments as being constrained by the lack of savings 
would probably be misleading. In Palestine there are few profitable investment opportunities so that 
domestic and foreign entrepreneurs are reluctant to invest in Palestine. We think that a description of 
the saving-investment link along Keynesian lines may be far more appealing to get the peculiarities or, 
better the pathologies, of the Palestinian investment climate. In this paper, the introduction of an ad 
hoc  investment  demand  function  allows  to  pinpoint  the  factors  that  make  domestic  and  foreign 
entrepreneurs reluctant to invest in Palestine. This function is a central issue in our analysis and will 
help to understand the mechanisms through which high transaction costs and market segmentation, by 
reducing expected profitability and capacity utilization, eventually curtail domestic capital formation. 
Palestinian  investments  seem  to  be  strongly  jeopardized  by  high  transaction  costs,  market 
fragmentation and the denial of secure access to large markets. A World Bank sample study finds that 
only 41 per cent of establishments of West Bank are selling more than 25 per cent of their products 
outside their specific area and in another area of the West Bank. Market fragmentation determines lack 
of market access but also lack of competitive prime (see World Bank, 2007a, pp. 25-26). Palestinian 
firms have been damaged by the fact that ‘because of non-tariff-barriers’, they do not have direct access 
to the largest and closest market available: the Israeli one. This is particularly bad for those tradable 
products which could compete with the Israeli ones: food, pharmaceutical, IT products (World Bank, 
2007a, p. 30)
3. 
According to the World Bank (2007a), “shrinking market access and the lack of free movement are 
the main constraints to growth for Palestinian firms [...] They know that they need to invest and have 
access to the necessary resources. However, they are unwilling to do so unless they are assure secure 
                                                 
3 This does not mean that any type of economic integration with Israel would be beneficial for the Palestinian economy. 
Many times Palestine has been analyzed in relation to Israel and the effects of their integration is at least controversial (Aix 
Group, 2004). For sure, the existing links with Israel have not helped structural transformations in the Palestinian economy, 
namely an increase in the share of industry, apart from construction, and of manufacturing in particular. In recent years, 
integration with Israel has got even more problematic due to the Israeli accession to WTO and the opening up of that 
economy to imports from Asia, mainly in low-skilled products, where in principle WBG could have an opportunity in the 
Israeli market. In this paper, therefore, we do not focus on the issues concerning the economic links of WBG and Israel, but 
rather on the Palestinian economy as such.   7
and predictable access to both domestic and international markets”(World Bank, 2007a, p. 2). Given 
persistent economic stagnation, “most Palestinian firms are operating at low capacity and because of 
the closure are steadily losing markets. Thus, they have little need to invest”(World Bank, 2007a, p. 23).  
In 1990 Bacha introduced a third constraint: the so-called fiscal constraint
4. This makes some sense 
in the case of Palestine, because of the lack of public saving due to the small tax base and the fiscal 
leakages  to  Israel.  Moreover,  the  fiscal  constraint  highlights  some  elements  of  an  investment 
constrained  economy  in  so  far  as  it  relies  on  the  crowding-in  effect  of  public  investment,  mainly 
infrastructure, on private investment. Clearly Palestine lacks of fundamental infrastructures and they are 
costly and unreliable when provided by Israel. As for the budget, part of the infrastructures is provided 
by international aid, but in the case of Palestine this particular way of supporting public investments 
does not seem to have a significant positive impact on private investments. The fiscal constraint picks 
up some elements of the Palestinian economy, but we prefer to concentrate more directly on the 
impediments to private investments and on the explanation of the lack of investment opportunities, 
due to the situation on the ground
5. 
 
3.  A simple theoretical model on Palestine 
In the last decade, protracted economic stagnation has induced a dualistic economy to emerge in 
Palestine. One the one hand, a small formal sector, which largely overlaps with industrial activities 
producing tradable goods, has shrunk even further. On the other hand, an expanding informal sector 
based on agriculture and service activities producing non-tradable goods has provided an alternative to 
open unemployment. Despite this fact, here we assume a simple one-sector economy and concentrate 
on investments opportunities in the formal sector. Actually, rising informality in Palestine is a side-
product  of  declining  formal  activities  or  of  the  impossibility  for  Palestinian  people  to  find  formal 
employment in Israel
6.  
Let’s assume a small open economy which produces a single tradable good through a Leontief 
production function using capital and labour. X is total Palestinian output,  P is the corresponding 
price, which is exogenous due to the small-country assumption. Accordingly, equation (1) defines cost 
decomposition of domestic production. 
X P K rP wL X P I θ + + =    (1) 
                                                 
4 Other definitions such as capacity and investment constraint have also been used, see Ros (2000). 
5 2006 was a case of  fiscal constraint because of the aid squeeze following Hamas’ victory in the elections. 
6 See  Cimoli,  Primi  and  Pugno  (2006)  on  economic  growth,  the  dynamics  of  a  small  formal  sector  and  widespread 















τ    (2) 
u pb x r p ) ( ω − =    (3) 
p x p ) 1 ( θ − = is  the  value  of  a  unit  of  “effective”  output  in  terms  of  the  price  of  the  capital 
good, ) / ( I P P p =  and  ) / ( P w = ω is the real wage in terms of the domestic product. 
In equation (1), w stands for the domestic monetary wage, which is assumed to be fixed according 
to a Lewis-type argument
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8.  
Although Palestine is involved in a de-facto custom union with Israel and it is open to free trade 
relationships with several third countries, Palestinian goods do not move freely inside and outside 
Palestine. The Palestinian economy faces very high transaction costs
9; Palestinian goods are usually 
subjected to extensive check-point procedures. Time-consuming security and technical controls imply 
time delays for Palestinian goods to reach markets and quite often part of the output gets lost due to 
the perishable nature of traded goods and to the discretion of borders authorities. In this paper we 
catch immediate output losses by introducing parameter θ in equation (1) and by modelling transaction 
costs as iceberg costs which reduce the quantity of output Palestinian firms actually bring to markets
10. 
Ceteris paribus, being X the total amount of output produced, a fixed share θ of it is irremediably lost 
due to movement restrictions. Only a fraction (1-θ) of domestic output (and of the ensuing revenues) 
has  to  be  taken  into  account  to  get  the  “net”  total  income  that  is  effectively  distributed  among 
productive inputs. 
In  equation  (2)  we  use  a  simple  Kaleckian  cost-plus  function  to  describe  price  formation  in 
Palestine; we assume the domestic price P , the labour/output coefficient b and the wage rate w to be 
exogenous. And the mark-up rate τ is endogenous. Equation (2) shows the negative effects of high 
transaction  costs  on  the  profitability  of  Palestinian  firms.  Whilst  ((1/b)=X/L)  stands  for  labour 
productivity at the end of the production process, ((1-θ)/b) is the ex-post effective value added per unit of 
labour once output losses are considered. It goes without saying that high transaction costs, by reducing 
                                                 
7 According to PCBS (2009b), besides open unemployment, disguised unemployment largely affects agriculture and service 
activities. It thus appear reasonable to assume a perfectly-elastic labour supply in the Palestinian formal sector. 
8 Palestinian capital goods are largely imported from abroad. In this paper, we assume the Palestinian capital stock to be 
made up by both imported and home-produced goods. We assume a fixed share (1-β) of the domestic capital stock and 
domestic investments to be imported, the remaining (small) share β being produced domestically. Accordingly, the price PI 
of each unit of the capital stock K is an average of the domestic price  P and of the foreign price PF with weights β and (1-
β), respectively. 
9 Palestinian truck drivers who have to follow uncomfortable roads in order to reach customers or complex and protracted 
back-to-back procedures at check points. 
10 Administrative inefficiencies would have an effect on the value of  output similar to that of transaction costs.   9
Palestinian  labour  productivity,  increase  unit  costs
11 and  reduce  the  mark-up  rate  τ.  The  ensuing 
negative effect on the profit rate r is set in equation (3); for any given level of capacity use u (=X/K), 
the higher θ, the lower is r and the profit rate of Palestinian firms. 
With  prices  established  on  international  markets,  effective  demand  for  Palestinian  goods 
determines the level of economic activity and capacity use. Effective demand, in turn, comes from 
demand injections, which in our model are given by desired investments and net exports, and demand 
leakages,  that  is  to  say  domestic  savings.  According  to  the  stylized  facts  above, all  these  variables 
assume specific features in Palestine. Let us examine them in more details. 
We assume a homogeneous saving propensity between wage earners and profit earners, both social 
classes saving a constant fraction “s” out of their income
12. Equation (4) defines total domestic savings: 
[ ] X P s wL K rP s swL K srP S S S I I w ) 1 ( θ π − = + = + = + =    (4) 
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Equation (5) defines the growth rate of the domestic capital stock as it is allowed by the available 
domestic savings. 
S g  is a positive function of capacity utilization u, and of  the saving propensity, 
whilst it is negatively influenced by transaction costs θ, because they curtail the net income to be 
distributed to productive inputs.   
Investment demand in Palestine is influenced by the obstacles and the uncertainty domestic firms 
have to face. In this paper we propose an ad-hoc investment demand function in order to represent the 
specific Palestinian investment climate. This is modelled in equation (6) below:  
n n
i r u u g γ α ρ + − + = ) (    (6) 
With α, γ > 0;  ( ) f n r r f / = γ and 0 )) / ( / ( > ∂ ∂ f n r r γ  
                                                 
11 Akkay et al. (2008) and World Bank (2006b) describe how high transaction costs reduce labour productivity and increase 
unit costs of Palestinian firms. Besides direct output losses due to back-to-back procedures and handling of transported 
goods at check points, Palestinian transport firms cope with uncertainty at check points by using more than one driver per 
journey. After the Second Intifada check-point controls allow trucks in the West Bank to make only two rotations per day 
instead of three rotations as in the pre-Intifada period. Akkaya et al. (2008) estimate labour productivity in the transport 
sector to have diminished by 33 percent in the aftermath of the Second Intifada. 
12 The Palestinian productive system is mostly composed by family-owned small-medium size firms. As a consequence, it is 
often hard to distinguish between different social classes, workers and capitalists in particular, as far as consumption and 
saving decisions are concerned.   10
Equation (6) includes three elements and requires a detailed explanation. First, take parameter ρ  
which represents entrepreneurs’ animal spirits, which are always very difficult to model. Following 
Lavoie (1992, 1995), let assume them to be linked to the expected average growth rate of Palestinian sales 
over the planning horizon of Palestinian entrepreneurs. Economic theory generally agrees on the idea 
that  a  potentially  large  market  is  a  pre-condition  to  undertake  investments  in  industrial  activities. 
Palestine is a typical case of a market constrained economy. Palestinian firms are close to and might 
potentially benefit of easy access to pretty large markets, but they are confined into small local enclaves 
(see  World  Bank,  2007b).  Small  local  markets  obviously  dampen  firms  expectations  about  sale 
dynamics and make productive investments worthless.  
In this paper, we try to improve on previous works; as a matter of fact we attempt to specify in 
more detail entrepreneurs’ expectations about the future changes in sales as follows: 
) , , ( λ ρ
e sh n f =   with  0 , , ) ( > ′ ′ ′ λ n sh
e  and  1 0 < < λ  
Parameter ρ firstly depends on market dimension. Following Krugman (1991), let assume market 
dimension to be captured by total population composing both the domestic economy and foreign 
trading  partners.  Ceteris  Paribus,  if  n  is  the  natural  growth  rate  of  market  size  due  to,  let’s  say, 
population growth, the higher n, the larger the expected average growth rate of Palestinian sales and 
Palestinian entrepreneurs’ willingness to expand production capacity.  
Expected average changes in Palestinian sales respond positively also to the market share (sh
e) 
Palestinian firms expect to capture vis-a-vis foreign products on domestic and foreign markets. Given n, 
the higher sh
e, the higher is the expected trend growth rate of Palestinian sales and therefore domestic 
entrepreneurs’ desire to invest.     
In the case of Palestine, besides the “natural” growth rate of the market and expected market 
shares,  the  expected  average  growth  rate  of  Palestinian  sales  may  vary  due  to  better  economic 
integration  among  now  separated  areas  in  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  Let’s  take  the  candy  industry  in 
Nablus, for instance. It makes a big difference to serve the nine hundred thousand people in North 
West Bank instead of producing for the four million Palestinians living in West Bank and Gaza Strip 
plus, hopefully, for the six million Israelis. Even without changes in Palestinian (expected) market 
shares  or  in  the  natural  growth  rate  of  domestic  and  foreign  markets,  market  integration  can 
considerably boost the expected average growth rate of Palestinian sales by simply giving Palestinian 
firms’ the opportunity to have secure access to large markets. Accordingly, Palestinian firms may revise 
and remarkably raise their investment plans.   
In our model, parameter λ gets the degree of market integration inside Palestine and between 
Palestine  and  foreign  countries  and  represents  which  part  of  existing  potential  markets  and  of  its   11
natural growth rate can effectively reached by Palestinian firms. Values of λ close to 1 mean advanced 
economic integration and the possibility for Palestinian firms to access domestic and foreign markets 
without restrictions. On the opposite, values of λ close to zero stand for Palestinian firms excluded 
from foreign markets and de-facto forced into very small local areas. Higher values of λ, i.e. a better 
economic integration, positively affect the expected average growth rate of Palestinian sales, improve 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits and raise capital accumulation in equation (6).   
The second element in equation (6) concerns capacity utilization. Apart from the expected changes 
in sales, entrepreneurs plan investments according to the degree at which the existing capital stock is 
used. The lower is u the higher is idle capacity and the less firms’ need to expand their production base 
(see  World  Bank,  2007a).  In  equation  (6),  we  assume  a  positive  relationship  between  investment 
demand g
i and current capacity use u. According to Committeri (1986), investment decisions respond 
positively to the difference between the current rate of capacity use u and the normal rate of capacity use 
un. Parameter α gets the sensitivity of Palestinian investment plans to such a discrepancy. We define the 
normal rate of capacity use as “the percentage of total practical capacity at which firms can expect to 
operate on the average of the business cycle”(Lavoie, 1992, p. 122). If current capacity use falls lower 
than the normal one, entrepreneurs curtail investments. Vice versa, values of u higher than un may be 
perceived as a sign of booming economic activity and of the need to scale up production capacity 
through additional investments. 
The different description of Keynesian animal spirits and the third element in equation (6) make 
our  investment  demand  function  a  bit  different  from  those  proposed  in  the  past  in  some  post-
Keynesian contributions (Hein, Lavoie and van Treek, 2008, Skott, 2008). This term tries to get the 
relevance of expected profitability for investment decisions in Palestine. High transaction costs, besides 
affecting current profitability, also reduce expected profitability (to be defined below), which in turn 
hampers entrepreneurs’ willingness to invest. Low expected profitability is a fundamental factor behind 
poor capital formation in Palestine.  
Let’s define expected profitability as the normal profit rate rn, i.e. the profit rate evaluated at the 
normal level of capacity use. There are at least two ways through which rn influences Palestinian capital 
formation. First, expected profitability has an immediate positive effect on investment demand g
i. Other 
things being constant, the higher rn, the higher expected returns from domestic investments and firms’ 
propensity  to  invest.  Second,  expected  profitability  influences  investment  decisions  by  altering  the 
“profit-gap” with respect to investments abroad. Due to the existing discrepancies between domestic 
expected profitability and that of foreign investments, most Palestinian people and financial institutions 
prefer  keeping  capital  abroad  instead  of  employing  it  at  home(World  Bank,  2008;  Valensisi  and 
Missaglia, 2009). In equation (6) we assume parameter γ to represent the sensitiveness of Palestinian   12
entrepreneurs  to  the  profit  gap  and  to  depend  positively  on  the  ratio  between  rn  and  the  foreign 
exogenous profit rate rf.. 
We now need to take into account the foreign exchange dimension of the Palestinian economy. 
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In equation (7), EX and M stands for Palestinian exports and imports respectively, their difference 
being  net  exports  or  the  trade  balance  account  (TB).  On  the  left-hand-side  of  equation  (7),  Ω  
represents foreign remittances and current transfers entering the current account balance (CA). On the 
right-hand-side, Sf are foreign savings, i.e. foreign aids targeting long-run economic development and 
international loans inflowing into the Palestinian economy. 
According to stylized fact 2, Palestine chronically records dramatic trade deficits, which are due to 
structural causes and are rooted in the backwardness of the domestic productive system. This fact has 
important short-term consequences. As a matter of fact the pathological Palestinian dependence on 
imported goods makes demand stimuli useless to sustain economic activity, because they are likely to 
increase imports instead of generating additional domestic production. 
Despite the very high trade deficit of around 50 percent of domestic GDP, this does not seem to 
be a binding constraint to growth. International concerns about the political situation in Palestine play a 
fundamental rule to stimulate generous aid, thus relaxing the external constraint. In equation (7) Ω 
stands for the considerable foreign remittances and current transfers which yearly flow into Palestine 
and partially offset its enormous and structural trade deficit. Sf,, in turn, represents foreign savings. 
Besides international loans to Palestinian public and private agents, they also consist of capital transfers 
aiming  at  supporting  investment  projects  and  the  long-run  economic  development  of  Palestine 
(Missaglia and Valensisi, 2009)
13. Abundant remittances, current and capital transfers as well as foreign 
loans all help to compensate the huge Palestinian trade imbalance. It could become a major obstacle to 
economic development in the future, but for the time being it does not play a major role. In this model, 
we therefore neglects the external constraint.  
   
                                                 
13 After the signing of the Oslo Treaty in 1993, international financial support to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) 
was mainly directed to foster long-term investment projects (see Adam, Cobhan and Kanafani, 2004). The outbreak of the 
Second Intifadah and the liquidity crisis following the Hamas’ electoral win in 2006, hovewer, have subsequently forced 
international aids to be temporally redirected towards current budget support. In the most recent years, according to the 
IMF (2007), capital transfers from abroad have returned to be and are expected to remain relevant sources for investment 
financing in Palestine .       13
4.  The  Short-run  equilibrium  and  the  effects  of  high  transaction  costs  and 
market fragmentation 
4.1. Short-run macroeconomic equilibrium 
We define the short run as the time horizon in which agents’ expectations are given and not 
subjected to revision. Entrepreneurs’ animal spirits and the normal rate of capacity use are taken as 
exogenous. In order to set the conditions for macroeconomic equilibrium in Palestine, let’s first take 
equation (7) and normalize both sides by the value of Palestinian capital stock. Following Taylor (1983), 
define ∆ =(CA/PIK) as the ratio between the current account balance and the domestic capital stock 
and, according to the Palestinian context, let assume it is given and negative (i.e. ∆ < 0). 
According to the National Accounting of open economies, domestic investments must be equal to 
the disposal of domestic savings minus the current account balance. In terms of our model we have: 
CA S I P I − =  
Normalizing both sides of such a relationship for the value of the Palestinian capital stock (PIK), 
we obtain: 
∆ − =
S i g g    (8) 
Equation (8) sets the condition for macroeconomic equilibrium in Palestine. Substituting equations 
(3), (5) and (6) in (8) and rearranging we can therefore get the short-run equilibrium levels of capacity 
use u
* and of the capital accumulation g
*. 
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Equation  (9)  defines  the  short-run  equilibrium  level  of  capacity  use  u
*  according  to  demand 
leakages and injections composing effective demand for Palestinian goods. At the numerator, u
* is 
positively influenced by entrepreneurs’ animal spirits ρ as well as the response of desired investments to 
domestic expected profitability which depends on the level of γ and the expected profit rate rn=(xp - 
ωpb)un. According to our assumptions, relevant Palestinian current account deficits (i.e. ∆ < 0) due to 
large and structural trade imbalances depress economic activity and capacity use. A higher normal   14
capacity use, by increasing the gap with current capacity, may discourage investment plans and lower 
economic activity through parameter α. At the denominator, we assume the well-known Keynesian 
stability condition sxp > α to hold true, sxp representing ‘demand leakages’ linked to savings whilst α 
gives the sensitiveness of the entrepreneurs  to current capacity use and their response in terms of 
domestic investments. Other way around, we assume parameter α to be sufficiently small and domestic 
investments not to overreact to changes in current capacity use so as to ensure a stable short-run 
equilibrium.  
Equation  (10)  resembles  the  well-known  Cambridge  equation  in  open  economies;  sxp  and  ∆ 
depend on domestic and foreign saving disposal while u
* affects capital formation from the demand 
side.       
In figure 1 we represent the Palestinian short-run macroeconomic equilibrium by plotting the 
‘investment demand’ function (6) and the right-hand-side of equation (8), here labelled ‘saving supply’ 
function.  Figure  1  shows  the  contractionary  effects  of  the  Palestinian  trade  deficits  on  economic 
activity and capacity use. Trade balance, by affecting the current account balance, acts on the intercept 
of the ‘saving supply’ function, shifting it up or down. The Palestinian trade deficit, in particular, by 
genereting a negative current account balance, gives rise to a positive intercept of the “saving supply” 
function and moves the “saving supply” function up. Given the investment demand function, both the 
equilibrium levels of capacity utilization and capital accumulation fall much smaller than in case of an 
economy with positive trade ad current accounts (a negative intercept in figure 1).  
















Two mechanisms are at work. First, the Palestinian trade deficit stands out as a relevant ‘demand 
leakage’ that curbs economic activity. Huge foreign savings, aid and remittances, definitely alleviate the 
every-day life of the Palestinian people, by stimulating domestic consumption and public expenditures. 
However they do not eradicate the structural productive weaknesses of the economy, that is to say the   15
large  dependence  on  imported  goods,  therefore the  higher  demand generates  more  imports  and  a 
deeper trade deficit. Palestine risks becoming addicted to the economic pathologies which foreign aid 
can produce. 
Quite  apart  from  this  structural  weakness,  our  paper  highlights  another  negative  mechanism: 
foreign capital inflows stimulate domestic demand and in principle this could have a very positive 
impact on domestic production, however high transaction costs and market fragmentation reduce the 
‘effective demand’ confronting the Palestinian firms. 
 
4.2. Short-run effects of high transaction costs 
In our model rising transaction costs, i.e. higher values of parameter θ, affect capacity utilization 
and capital accumulation in two different ways. First, rising transaction costs reduce the effective income  
to be distributed to productive inputs. According to equation (4), this reduces domestic savings so that, 
for any given level of the investment demand, capacity utilization u paradoxically increases to fill the 
saving gap between saving supply and investment demand. In the post-Keynesian rubric, this effect 
goes  under  the  title  of  “cost  paradox”  (Lavoie,  1992).  Second,  rising  transaction  costs  reduce 
investment demand through other two main channels. On the one hand, rising transaction costs reduce 
expected profitability. Other things being equal, lower values of rn, discourage domestic entrepreneurs 
from enlarging existing plants so that investment demand and capacity use  decrease. On the other 
hand, the lower rn the higher the profit gap between domestic and foreign investment opportunities. 
Domestic entrepreneurs prefer to invest their capitals abroad; in equation (6), parameter γ decreases, so 
that an additional negative effect on investment demand and capacity utilization emerges. 
In figure 2, rising values of θ reduce the slope of the ‘saving supply’ function because of the “the 
cost  paradox”.  Simultaneously,  the  ‘investment  demand’  function  shifts  downward,  due  to  the 
reduction  in  the  normal  profit  rate  rn  and  in  parameter  γ.  The  final  outcome  is  not  clear.  Quite 
reasonably, according to the evidence above, if the contraction of desired investments g
i is sufficiently 
large, an overall negative effect of increasing transaction costs on capacity use and capital formation 
emerges. The Palestinian economy moves from point 1 to point 2 in figure 2. 
   16






















It is possible to define a sufficient but not necessary condition for higher transaction costs to 
curtail current capacity use and capital formation. Let’s take the short-run equilibrium value of the 
growth rate of the capital stock and derive it with respect to θ. From equation (6) we get: 
n n r r u
g
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Given that  ) / ( θ ∂ ∂ n r  and  ) / ( θ γ ∂ ∂ are both negative, attention can focus on term  ) / (
* θ ∂ ∂u : 
After some mathematical passages and reminding that  )) 1 /( 1 ( ) / ) / (( θ ξ θ − − = ∂ ∂ p x , we get: 
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In condition (C.1),  θ γˆ is the (negative) elasticity of parameter γ  with respect to transaction costs θ. 
θ γˆ describes the intensiveness of  Palestinian entrepreneurs’ response to changes in transaction costs, 
that is to say the vigour of their willingness to invest at home, and therefore the intensiveness of the 
response to the gap between domestic expected profitability and the foreign one.     17
Condition  (C.1)  establishes  the  case  for  ) / (
* θ ∂ ∂u  and  ) / (
* θ ∂ ∂g  to  be  negative.  At  the 
denominator  of  condition  (C.1),  η  is  higher  than  υ  in  order  to  have  positive  profits  inside  the 
Palestinian economy. On the right-hand side of condition (C.1), η gets the negative effects that higher 
transaction costs induce on capacity use and capital accumulation by cutting expected profitability and 
therefore  desired  investments.  On  the  contrary,  µ  comes  from  the  cost  paradox.  It  represents 
decreasing saving disposal and lower demand leakages due to lower net income out of transaction 
costs. Condition (C.1) undoubtedly applies if η is higher than µ and the left-hand-side of condition 
(C.1) turns out to be negative. Alternatively, condition (C.1) still holds true in case of µ higher than η 
but the right-hand-side lower than the left-hand-side  θ γˆ . 
4.3. Short-run effects of market fragmentation 
Israeli security measures effectively divide Palestine in small enclaves and isolate Palestinian firms 
from foreign markets (World Bank, 2007b). In this case there is an unambiguously negative impact on 
short run market equilibrium. The decline in the expected market size leads to a decrease of parameter 
λ, which immediately hurts entrepreneurs’ animal spirits ρ, thus discouraging investments. The final 
outcome will be a reduction in capacity utilization and capital accumulation. In figure 3 the ‘investment 
demand’ function shifts downward; the Palestinian economy moves from point 1 to point 3, capacity 



























Quite a consistent body of literature confirms these findings. Shaban (1999) states that “closure 
interrupts  the  production  processes  (Shaban,  1999,  p.  58)”  and  that  Palestinian  firms’  sales  have 
declined steeply, ranging from 9 to 90 percent after the 1996 closures, “due to the impossibility to   18
deliver  goods  to  customer”(Shaban,  1999,  p.  59).  Even  further,  he  stresses  that  “the  demand  for 
investment has diminished under closure policy because of an overall decline in aggregate demand [and 
because]  closures  generally  interrupt  sales  and  increase  operation  costs,  thus  reducing  overall 
profitability as well as the incentive for new investments (Shaban, 1999, p. 62)”. Akkaya et al. (2008) 
present  an  economic  picture  of  Palestine  close  to  that  of  Shaban:  “closures  disrupt  trade  flows, 
investments and domestic productions”(Akkaya et al., 2008, p. 2). Finally  UNCTAD (2009) evaluates 
that “the cumulative economic cost of six-years (2000 – 2005) of tight closure policy is around 8.4 
billion dollars...twice the size of [Palestinian] GDP in 1999”(UNCTAD, 2009, p. 7). More in general, it 
can  be  affirmed  that  “these  conditions  [i.e.  the  imposed  restrictions  to  Palestinian  firms]  have 
intensified an economic and social stress, causing a sharp fall in real investments, unprecedented rates 
of unemployment and poverty and a rapid decline in all economic indicators”(UNCTAD, 2009, p. 1).        
 
5.  The long-run economic dynamics 
5.1. The changing expectations of the entrepreneurs 
The  short-term  analysis  above  takes  agents’  expectations  as  given,  in  the  long  time  horizon 
economic  actors  can  adjust  expectations.  We  will  see  that  high  transaction  costs  and  market 
fragmentation may trigger off vicious processes in the way economic agents revise their expectations 
about the future. In the long run, the depressed investment climate emerging from low values of 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits ρ and of normal capacity use un may induce poor capital formation to 
become a pathological feature of Palestine. 
Let’s  assume  a  medium/long-run  perspective  in  which  economic  expectations  are  periodically 
revised, the entrepreneurs adjust their own animal spirits and normal capacity use. In an uncertain 
economic environment the normal rate of capacity use is a convention emerging from entrepreneurs’ 
conjectures about the average degree of capacity use over the business cycle (see Lavoie, 1992). The 
normal  rate  of  capacity  use  may  either  come  from  past  experience  or  be  the  result  of  strategic 
considerations  about  the  desired  level  of  spare  capacity  needed  to  prevent  competitive  entries. 
Depending on the interpretation chosen, un may follow different adjusting mechanisms (see Dutt, 1997 
and Skott, 2008). 
In the case of Palestine un can be better thought as a history-based convention. Palestine is a deeply 
unstable environment and the effective rate of capacity use may vary due to conditions, which are out 
of control of domestic entrepreneurs. Therefore the normal rate at which domestic firms expect to 
work may emerge from the revision of past experience rather than from strategic decisions. In line with 
this  perspective,  equation  (11)  assumes  un  to  evolve  according  to  an  adaptive  mechanism  in  which 
Palestinian firms revise their expected level of capacity use un on the base of the existing gap with   19
respect to the current level of capacity use u. Following Lavoie (1995), Dutt (1997) and Taylor (2004) 
we assume: 
) , ( ) ( n n n u l u u u ρ ψ = − =
•
   (11) 
According to equation (11), if u is higher than un economic agents increase their ‘expected degree 
of  capacity  use’ and l(ρ,  un)  is  positive.  If  the  current  capacity  use  is  lower  than  the  normal  one, 
Palestinian firms revise downward their ‘expected degree of capacity use’ according to the adjustment 
speed ψ.     
As  to  entrepreneurs  animal  spirits,  given  the  “natural”  growth  rate  of  market  size  due  to 
population growth, adjustments in expected sale changes and in entrepreneurs’ animal spirits result 
from changes in expected market share sh
e and in the surrounding political/economic climate. This is 
formally stated in equation (12): 
ρ
•
= z(u(un,ρ))−ς(θ,λ)ρ = m(ρ,un)   (12) 
With  0 > ′ z    and  0 > ′ ′ z  if  ) ( ) ( n n u u u u < ; 
                              0 < ′ ′ z  if  ) ( ) ( n n u u u u >  
Let us examine this relationship. There is widespread consensus among economists that a strong 
positive link exists between economic activity, technological improvements, the evolution of firms’ 
competitiveness and of their market shares (see Verspagen (1995)). Technological improvements based 
on increasing experience and deeper technological knowledge “occur as a by-product of productive 
activity”(see Rosenberg, 1982). This is the case of “learning-by-doing” and “learning-by-using” as well 
as of the economy-wide diffusion of the improvements deriving from them. As to learning-by-doing, 
given K, the higher u, the higher total output and the possibility to accumulate technological knowledge 
by producing goods in larger quantity. As to “learning-by-using”, the higher u, the more intensively we 
use the existing capital goods and the faster we learn to improve them. Last but not least, “when 
learning takes place, the innovation is improved and adapted to different environments, thus making it 
more attractive to a wider set of adopter”(Hall, 2005, p. 470). Therefore, technological improvements 
and  the  accumulation  of  technological  knowledge  appear  as  the  ultimate  sources  of  increasing 
competitiveness and of rising market shares. 
These mechanisms could be particularly effective in the case of the Palestinian economy in which 
there is large scope for introducing technological progress and improving competitiveness of domestic 
firms (see World Bank, 2007a). A higher capacity use u will make it more likely that Palestinian firms   20
introduce technological improvements, work at more efficient production scales, thus increasing their 
market  share.  In  equation  (12)  we  assume  a  positive  relationship  between  the  dynamics  of 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits, the evolution of expected Palestinian market share and capacity utilization 
u. If Palestinian entrepreneurs expect market shares to increase and sale flows to grow faster they will 
be convinced to expand production capacity and to upward revise their animal spirits
14. 
More  precisely,  we  assume  such  a  relation  to  follow  a  S-shaped  curve(see  Figure  4).  At  low-
medium level of capacity use, with u < u , increasing capacity use may give momentum to technological 
improvements, domestic firms competitiveness and the connected economic expectations. At more 
advanced stages, when u > u , the scope for learning processes to carry out further improvements may 
narrow, so that the link between u and m(ρ, un) progressively runs out and the process of technological 
improvements and rising expectations meets an upper ceiling
15. 
The second element in equation (12) establishes a negative relationship between adjustments in 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits and their current level. This is a simple self-stabilizing process in the 
expectations about the growth rates of market shares and future sales. The higher sh
e and ρ, the lower 
the scope for further increases in Palestinian expected sales’ growth rate and entrepreneurs’ animal 
spirits. In equation (12), such a negative relationship between ρ and its own dynamics is mediated by 
parameter ς , which captures what Fontana and Marchionatti (2007) label the “political atmosphere” 
component in the formation of entrepreneurs’ animal spirits. Of course these factors are extremely 
relevant  in  Palestine,  given  that  stable  improvements  in  the  conditions  on  the  ground  and  in  the 
political  situation  can  have  deep  repercussions  on  the  economic  sphere.  They  might  ease  market 
conditions, reduce transaction costs and allow Palestinian goods to move freely inside and outside 
Palestine, this way leading Palestinian firms to permanently improve their expectations about future 
sales and scale up investment projects. 
We assume parameter ς to depend positively on transaction costs θ and negatively on the degree 
of  market  integration λ.  Ceteris  paribus,  higher(lower)  transaction  costs and  market  fragmentation 
induce the Palestinian investment climate to deteriorate(improve). This leads Palestinian firms to revise 
their expectations; they will perceive current animal spirits,  ρ, to be too optimistic(pessimistic). In 
equation  (12),  parameter  ς will  increase(decrease),  so  that  Palestinian  firms  will  opportunely 
downward(upward) adjust their expectations about future sale dynamics. 
                                                 
14 Here we do not explicitly model technological progress but we stress the relationship between the scope for technological 
progress and entrepreneurs’ expectations. Palestinian entrepreneurs will effectively get technological opportunities only if 
they can believe in improving market sales in the long run. 
15 This picture is close to that presented by Sachs et al. (2004) on Africa’s development, but the theoretical framework is 
completely different. In this model, we follow a demand-led approach which rests on cumulative mechanisms between lack 
of effective demand, depressed economic activity and poor capital accumulation.        21
5.2. Possible long-run scenarios in an expectation-driven Palestinian economy 
In order to analyze the long-run dynamics of Palestine, let consider the two loci for constant values 
of un andρ . From equation (11), substituting in it the short-run equilibrium value of current capacity 
use u
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According to the implicit function theorem, we get: 
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Where 
n r γˆ is the positive elasticity of parameter γ  with respect to the normal profit rate rn. Again, 
this term gives an idea on the intensity with which domestic entrepreneurs want to scale up investments 
at home when domestic expected profitability improves compared to foreign expected profitability.  
The slope of equation (13) can be either positive or negative depending on the effects normal 
capacity use has on its own dynamics. Given the positive effect ρ undoubtedly has on u and l(ρ,un), 
should normal capacity use present a stable dynamics, the slope of equation (13) will be positive. Such a 
scenario holds true if condition (C.2) applies. Alternatively, should higher values of un lead to further 
increases in normal capacity use and generate a destabilizing process, the slope of equation (13) will 
turn out to be negative. This happens when condition (C.2) is not met. 
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On the base of the implicit function theorem, we get:  
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Several possibilities arise. The signs of both numerator and denominator are uncertain and the 
denominator’s sign may vary depending on (z′). In order to keep things as simple as possible, here we 
restrict our attention to the case of an upward-sloping S-shaped locus for m(ρ,un)=0. In particular, we 
assume a positive effect of un on current capacity use u and therefore on 
•
ρ . Moreover, we imagine 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits not to follow an explosive dynamics, so that there is an overall negative 
relationship between ρ and its own adjustment process. Mathematically, we have: 
[ ] α γ ω γ > + −
n r p pb x ˆ ) (    (C.3)   
and 
0 ) ( < − − ′ α ζ p sx z    (C.4) 
Condition (C.3), simply states that the numerator of equation (15) is positive. Its fulfilment is 
empirically grounded on the relevance that expected profitability plays to stimulate investment projects 
in Palestine as caught by term 
n r γˆ in condition (C.3). Higher values of un bid up domestic expected 
profitability and reduce the profit-gap with investments abroad. This stimulate Palestinian firms to 
increase domestic investments. If such an effect is sufficiently strong, i.e. term 
n r γˆ is sufficiently high, 
economic activity and capacity use increase. Entrepreneurs will revise upward their animal spirits thanks 
to better expectations on technological improvements and future sale dynamics. 
Condition  (C.4)  ensures  Harrodian  instability,  i.e.  explosive  dynamics  in  the  evolution  of 
entrepreneurs animal spirits ρ, not to take place. Entrepreneurs’ animal spirits ρ, on the contrary, 
follow  a  self-stabilizing  process.  On  the  one  hand,  condition  (C.4)  is  grounded  on  previous 
contributions  which  show  Harrodian  instability  not  to  be empirically  relevant  or  tamed  by  several 
stabilizing mechanisms (Lavoie, 1995; Hein, Lavoie and van Treek, 2008). On the other hand, and 
perhaps more interesting, its fulfilment opens up space for multiple equilibria to describe long-run 
development in Palestine. 
On  the  base  of  this  analysis,  many  different  scenarios  can  describe  the  long-run  economic 
development of Palestine. First, the two loci for stable values of ρ and un may not intersect, so that no 
long-run equilibria exist.  This is portrayed in figure 4 below. 
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Second, a unique-equilibrium scenario may apply having different stability properties depending on 
the slope of the locus for l(ρ , un) = 0 and on its intersection with the locus for m(ρ , un) = 0. In figure 
5, we represent a downward-sloping locus for l(ρ , un) = 0 (condition C.2 does not hold true) and a 
unique  saddle-path  long-run  equilibrium  in  Palestine.  In  figure  6,  on  the  contrary,  we  portray  an 
upward-sloping locus for l(ρ , un) = 0 (condition C.2 holds true) intersecting the locus for m(ρ , un) = 0 
in a unique stable equilibrium point. 
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Finally, different multiple equilibria may emerge should the locus for l(ρ , un) = 0 slopes positively 
(condition (C.2) is met so that  [ ] α γ ω γ > + − >
n r p p pb x sx ˆ ) ( )) and intersects the locus for m(ρ , un) = 0 
twice or more. From our point of view, this is by far the most relevant situation because it shows a 
wide range of opportunities and constraints to Palestinian economy development. We treat in details 
the case for multiple long-run equilibria in the next section. 
  
5.3. Economic restrictions, multiple equilibria and the Palestinian low-growth trap 
Let assume the two loci for m(ρ , un) = 0 and l(ρ , un) = 0 to intersect thrice so that three equilibria 
exist in the north-east quadrant of figure 7. Points A and C are two locally stable equilibria, point B is a 
locally  unstable  saddle-path  equilibrium.  At  any  equilibrium  point,  economic  expectations  are 
confirmed and not revised any longer, entrepreneurs’ animal spirits ρ assume a constant value and 
current capacity use u gets equal to normal capacity use un. Equilibrium A features persistently low 
values  of  both  ρ  and  un.  Equilibrium  C  shows  sustained  economic  activity  with  optimistic 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits. Equilibrium B lies in the middle. Accordingly, three different steady state 
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LR are the long-run values assumed by entrepreneurs’ animal spirits, 
domestic expected profitability, normal capacity use and domestic investment sensitivity to the profit 
gap. 
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According to equation (6LR), high levels of capacity use u
LR (=un
LR) increase long-run expected 
profitability and reduce the profit gap with respect to foreign investments. Both rn
LR and γ
LR increase in 
equation (6LR) and capital accumulation follows closely. Optimistic long-run animal spirits, i.e. high 
values of ρ
LR, further raise the steady state growth rate of capital stock. This fact emerges clearly in the 
south-west quadrant of figure 7, where we plot equation (6LR) and the long-run growth paths arising 
from equilibria A, B and C. The accumulation path associated to point C (gLR
C) is faster than capital 
accumulation  in  point B (gLR






In  Palestine  high  transaction  costs  and  market  fragmentation  curb  economic  activity,  reduce 
capacity utilization and frustrate entrepreneurs’ animal spirits. Such a gloomy scenario does not appear 
as a temporary condition. On the contrary, it appears like a well-established feature of the Palestinian 
economy. Low levels of current capacity use and chronically depressed entrepreneurs’ animal spirits   26
generate  perverse  cycles  in  the  adjustment  process  of  economic  expectations  so  that  Palestinian 
development is permanently frustrated. 
In terms of figure 7 Palestine appears stuck in the low equilibrium point A. According to equation 
(11), low levels of current capacity use lead Palestinian firms to downward revise their opinions about 
the normal level of capacity use and to maintain it unusually low, quite likely below un
B. Moreover, from 
equation (12), economic stagnation negatively affects the way in which Palestinian entrepreneurs’ adjust 
their animal spirits. They are likely to be lower than ρ
B , due to the lack of opportunities to introduce 
technological changes, to the enormous difficulties to gain market shares and to impossibility to have 
significant increases in sales. With these vicious mechanisms at work, Palestine ends up and remains 
locked in the low-growth trap equilibrium A. Palestinian firms’ current and normal capacity use persist to 
be abnormally low. The Palestinian long-run growth potential and capital accumulation get irremediably 
curtailed to the disappointing level gLR
A. Actually, such a low-growth trap closely resembles to the long-run 
scenario  prospected  by  Shaban  (1999):  without  dramatic  breakthrough  in  the  Israeli-Palestinian 
relationships, “border closures [will] have a detrimental impact on long-run economic development by 
instigating lower levels of investments and reduced efficiency of investment”(Shaban, 1999, p. 61). 
 
6.  Policy measures to unleash Palestinian growth potential 
With Palestine stuck in the low-growth equilibrium A, economic policy measures should aim to 
unleash Palestinian growth potential. A first and immediate measure may aim to provide Palestine with 
huge financial resources, let’s say a Marshall Plan for Palestine. Strong and prolonged financial support, 
it might be argued, might stimulate economic activity so as to induce domestic agents to upward revise 
their expectations, to increase normal capacity use and entrepreneurs’ animal spirits above threshold 
levels un
B and ρ
B (see figure 7) and to generate virtuous mechanisms among improving expectations, 
economic growth and fast capital accumulation. 
However, such a strategy may turn out to be useless and ineffective both in the short and in the 
long  run.  Palestine  already  benefits  of  considerable  external  support  but  its  impact  on  economic 
development has been extremely weak so far. Of course, external financing has improved Palestinian 
daily life standards, which is obviously important; yet, it has not led to faster capital accumulation, 
neither it has eliminated the structural weaknesses of the Palestinian productive system. With high 
transaction costs and market fragmentation still on the field, Palestinian firms will probably continue to 
be  uncompetitive  and  reluctant  to  invest.  Financial  support  will  mostly  result  in  worsening  trade 
deficits, without stimulating demand for domestic products; economic expectations will hardly improve 
and existing constraints to growth will not be removed. Palestine might experience a perverse Dutch   27
disease  effect,  which  further  deteriorates  the  competitiveness  of  Palestinian  firms  and  lowers 
Palestinian growth potential. 
The above considerations do not imply that financial support is not needed, but clearly is not 
enough  and  it  is  not  the  crucial  element  to  support  the  long  run  development  of  the  Palestinian 
economy. Notwithstanding all its problems, Palestine has a high growth potential. Before the second 
intifada there were good saving ratios by the households, Palestinian firms are close to large and rich 
markets and can dispose of a well-educated labour force (Dessus, 2004; World Bank, 2006c). Therefore, 
the  most  promising  development  strategy  should  reduce  transaction  costs,  remove  market 
segmentation and let Palestinian firms to do their business freely. 
Suppose  that  thanks  to  a  substantial  progress  in  the  Israeli-Palestinian  peace  process  market 
fragmentation is removed and transaction costs are cut. Lower values of θ increase current capacity use 
u. The same effect results from increasing market integration, a higher level of λ. Both facts stimulate 
capital accumulation. 
Such  immediate  consequences  could  entail  much  more  important  long-lasting  changes,  by 
influencing  the  adjustments  process  of  entrepreneurs’  expectations.  Increasing  current  capacity  use 
induce  Palestinian  firms  to  upward  revise  their  conjectures  about  un.  Lower  transaction  costs  and 
market fragmentation allow Palestinian firms to better provide domestic and foreign markets. Expected 
sale dynamics and animal spirits are scaled up; if sufficiently strong, these facts could persistently raise 
long-run capital formation. 
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In figure 8, the locus for 
•
n u = 0 moves downward. Given the positive effects of lower transaction 
costs on current capacity use u
*, an increase in un is required to maintain l(ρ, un) equal to zero. At the 
same time, the locus for m(ρ, un)=0 moves up. Decreasing transaction costs and higher current capacity 
use favour technological improvements, Palestinian firms’ competitiveness and their expectations about 
                                                 
16 On the base of the short-run analysis above, our findings do not change much in case we consider the long-run effects of 
market integration, i.e. an increase in parameter λ.   28
future sales. According to equation (12), a reduction in normal capacity use is needed to counterbalance 
more optimistic entrepreneurs animal spirits and to keep ρ constant. 
Figure 8 – Long-run effects of restriction removal and unleashed Palestinian growth potential 
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If the removal of market fragmentation and the reduction in transaction costs are strong and 
convincing,  the  Palestinian  low-growth  trap  may  simply  disappear.  Mounting  investments  from 
confident  entrepreneurs  may  sustain  economic  activity  and  capacity  use,  which  in  turn  stimulate 
entrepreneurs’ confidence and their propensity to invest. In figure 8, Palestine may autonomously move 
towards the high, stable and unique equilibrium C, in which economic growth would be much higher 
than the disappointing results recorded so far and capital accumulation would outstrip the mere 15 
percent (of domestic GDP) averaged between 1994 and 2007. Palestine would enter in a sustained 
steady state long-run growth path. 
Two important observations have to be done about this scenario. First, several problems may still 
persist, the structural Palestinian trade deficit above all, thus a foreign exchange constraint might arise. 
Nevertheless, fast and sustained capital accumulation may be a source of structural change so that the 
Palestinian dependence on imported goods may be reduced
17. 
Second, it is important to remark that in the long-run perspective there is a major difference 
between  peace talks and the establishing of an independent Palestinian State with complete economic 
sovereignty. In the long-run scenario Palestinian entrepreneurs will improve their expectations about 
future  sale  changes  only  if  they  will  be  fully convinced  that:  a)  high  transaction  costs  will  not  be 
                                                 
17 Structural changes in Palestine may imply an increasing share of domestic capital goods to be produced at home. This 
change can reduce the price PI of the investment good (provided that  P is lower than PF) and increase the relative price p, 
which in Palestine resembles the ‘terms of trade’, due to the lack of the exchange rate. According to equation (3), this fact 
increases domestic profits and further stimulates domestic investments. Moreover, structural changes may be a source of 
additional demand injections for home-produced goods.       29
reintroduced; b) the larger and more integrated markets they can serve will last in the future. There 
have already been too many occasions in which long run expectations about a positive solution to the 
conflict have been disappointed. On the other hand, it must be remembered that there has been a 
period in which political climate and entrepreneurs’ expectations seemed to become definitely more 
optimistic. Following the Oslo agreement and the idea that Palestinian sovereignty would have been 
gradually extended from zone A to zone B and C some notable investments took place in Palestine, in 
particular in the industrial zone of the Gaza Strip. 
The best way to favour Palestinian economic development is both easy and difficult to implement 
at the same time. On the one hand, stable market integration and reduction in transaction costs are 
cheap pro-growth interventions which do not require generous disbursements of financial resources. 
On the other hand, the political conditions to introduce these changes may be too far away.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper draws two main conclusions about the Palestinian economy. 
First, Palestine is characterized by high transaction costs which reduce the expected profitability, 
moreover market fragmentation considerably limits the size of the market and the expected sales by 
Palestinian firms. In the short-run these facts discourage entrepreneurs which are reluctant to invest so 
that Palestinian capital formation never takes off; an investment-constrained economy emerges. Poor 
investment demand causes extremely low values of capacity utilization, slightly above fifty percent on 
average.  Capacity  utilization  turns  out  to  be  further  curbed  by  an  enormous  trade  deficit  and  the 
Palestinian structural dependence on imported goods.  
Second,  in  the  long  run  low  levels  of  capacity  utilization  and  capital  formation  have  become  
pathological features of the Palestinian economy. A vicious self-reinforcing process between frustrated 
economic activity and pessimistic adjustments in entrepreneurs expectations may give rise to a long-run 
low-growth trap. Low levels of economic activity and capacity utilization may induce domestic agents 
to  downward  revise  their  conjectures  about  normal  capacity  use  and  expected  profitability.  This 
situation  reduces  the  incentives  of  Palestinian  firms’  to  introduce  technological  progress  and  the 
possibilities to exploit the scale externalities of larger markets. High transaction costs and the small 
market  size  due  to  its  fragmentation  lead  to  permanent  reduction  in  Palestinian  long-run  growth 
potential. 
In this paper we highlight some conditions to overcome this gloomy situation and to unleash the 
growth potential of the Palestinian economy.  
In  the  short-run  peace  talks  and  some  progress  on  the  situation  on  the  ground  may  help  to 
increase    current  capacity  utilization,  u,  and  the  growth  rate  of  capital  accumulation,  g,  two  very   30
important  aspects,  which  might  improve  the  economic  climate  and  the  living  conditions  of  the 
Palestinian people. However, the process of economic development can be triggered off only if the 
short run improvement are sufficiently strong; this means a drastic reduction of transaction cost, a 
marked decrease of θ, and an important expansion in the markets facing Palestinian firms, a substantial 
increase of λ. Economic growth can be sustained in the long run only if the prospects of higher future 
sales are permanently incorporated into the process of entrepreneurs’ adaptation of their expectations 
about the dynamic of future sales. This implies that the entrepreneurs must be convinced that the lower 
transaction  costs  and  the  larger  market  size  are  permanent  changes  with  respect  to  the  existing 
conditions
18. 
Improvements in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks may reduce transaction costs and favour economic 
integration and may even induce a more optimistic investment climate. However Palestine has already 
seen  temporary  improvements  in  the  economic  situation  and  the  removal  of  some  check-points, 
although useful to encourage Palestinian recovery, will not eliminate the low-growth trap Palestine is 
stuck in. In the north-east quadrant of figure 7 the low-growth trap will slightly move to the right but it 
won’t  disappear.  Per se  they  will  not  give  rise  to  the  structural  shifts,  the  radical  changes  and  the 
sustained development process described in figure 8. These radical changes can only derive from a 
permanent improvement in the way in which the entrepreneurs adapt their sale expectations; they 
foresee a sustained process of market expansion which can lead to recurring expansion of their future 
sales. To use a somehow symbolic expression: the Palestinian entrepreneurs must ‘see these larger and 
rising market’, which justifies the increase in the existing productive capacity. 
It is difficult to have a permanent improvement in the investment climate without the creation of 
an independent Palestinian State with complete economic sovereignty; a state which may give a sense of 
permanence to the larger market. An independent state can also negotiate trade agreements with its 
neighbours  and  run  independent  fiscal,  monetary  and  also  industrial  policies.  The  Asian  growth 
experiences show how important these aspects are in order  to achieve strong and sustained economic 
growth.  A Palestinian state may be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to achieve higher 
growth rates of capital accumulation and to move out of a low growth equilibrium, characterized by 
poor investment opportunities. 
 
                                                 
18 Of course the same will apply to foreign direct investments.   31
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